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I. INTRODUGTION
The defendant drove her car into the decedent's automobile. Six
months later the decedent killed himself. The plaintiff, administrator of
the decedent's estate, brought suit against the defendant in two counts.
Count I was an action for personal injuries arising from the accident.
Count II, in the alternative, was an action for wrongful death on the
theory that the injuries suffered in the accident aggravated an existing
epileptic condition and caused the decedent, under an irresistable impulse,
to take his own life. Each cause of action is available to a personal repre-
sentative in Missouri only by statute. The statute applicable to personal
injuries allows damages to the personal representative if, but only if, the
injuries did not result in the decedent's death;1 claims of wrongful death
accrue to the personal representative only if the injuries did result in the
decedent's death.2 In Missouri, can a plaintiff plead both causes of action?
Can a plaintiff submit instructions to the jury on both counts?s
The plaintiff, a business invitee, fell down a stairway leading to a
cellar as he sought entrance to a restroom to which he had been directed.
The plaintiff sued for injuries suffered as a result of the defendant's negli-
gence. The defendant submitted evidence to establish that it was light
enough for the plaintiff to see the stairs and argued that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent in not discovering the stairway. The plaintiff's
evidence, however, established that there was not enough light to see the
stairs. Consequently, the defendant wanted to submit an instruction that,
if the jury found there was not enough light for the plaintiff to see, then
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he stepped through the
doorway when it was so dark that he could not see the stairway. Can a
defendant do so in Missouri?4
1. RSMo § 537.020 (1978).
2. RSMo § 537.080 (1978).
3. This example is based on Wallace v. Bounds, 369 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1963).
The Missouri Supreme Court in Bounds did not allow the plaintiff to submit in-
structions based on both theories. For a discussion of Bounds, see text accompany-
ing notes 49 & 50 infra.
4. This factual situation is based on Pigg v. Bridges, 352 S.W.2d 28 (Mo.
En Banc 1961). The court in Pigg held that the instructions were inconsistent
and could not be submitted in the conjunctive. The court suggested in dictum,
however, that both theories could have been submitted in the disjunctive. See
text accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
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Trial attorneys are often confronted with situations where more than
one possible legal theory may be pursued, with the proper theory de-
pendent upon which set of inconsistent facts the jury finds to be true.
This problem traditionally surfaces both in pleading and in the submis-
sion of instructions to the jury.5 Missouri now allows the pleading of
inconsistent claims and apparently allows the pleading of inconsistent
defenses. 6 Less clear is Missouri's approach to the submission of in-
structions based on inconsistent theories of law. Although a party gen-
erally cannot submit instructions based on inconsistent theories,7 cases
vary in their applications of this standard, and several cases suggest that
this standard need not be applied at all.8 The purpose of this Comment is
to clarify and critique the Missouri position regarding pleadings and
submissions based on inconsistent theories.
Before a detailed analysis is undertaken, several terms should be de-
fined. Missouri case law discusses inconsistent claims9 and defenses10 at
the pleading stage and inconsistent theories"1 at the submission stage. In
both situations "inconsistency" customarily means that the proof neces-
sary to establish one theory, claim, or defense would necessarily disprove
a fact necessary to support the other.' 2 Several cases further suggest that
a mere "theoretical inconsistency," as opposed to inconsistent proof, will
not prevent a party from being allowed to plead inconsistent claims or
defenses or to submit instructions based on inconsistent theories."$ For
example, even though one theoretically cannot hold title to property both
by adverse possession and by having paid the purchase price, the proof
necessary to establish these theories may not be inconsistent. Thus, plead-
ing both theories may not be "inconsistent" and was allowed by one
Missouri court. 14 Other cases consider only a "theoretical inconsistency."
These cases hold the theories themselves to be inconsistent, rather than
looking at the evidence supporting the theories, and therefore the pleading
of both or submission of both would be improper. For example, one
Missouri court has held instructions based on contract and quantum
meruit to be "inconsistent," without ever considering the facts.' 5
5. See, e.g., Kick v. Franklin, 342 Mo. 715, 117 S.W.2d 284 (1938); Payne
v. White, 288 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. App., Spr. 1956).
6. See text accompanying notes 26-88 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 39-66 infra.
8. See, e.g., Pigg v. Bridges, 352 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. En Banc 1961) (discussed
in text accompanying notes 64-66 infra).
9. See, e.g., Burckhardt v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 534 S.W.2d 57, 63 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1975).
10. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Conran, 20 S.W.2d 968, 969 (Mo. App., Spr. 1929).
11. See, e.g., Mahan v. Baile, 358 Mo. 625, 633, 216 S.W.2d 92, 95-96 (1948);
Hampton v. Cantrell, 464 S.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Mo. App., Spr. 1971).
12. See, e.g., Hampton v. Cantrell, 464 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Mo. App., Spr.
1971); Vaughn v. Conran, 20 S.W.2d 968, 969 (Mo. App., Spr. 1929).
13. See Mahan v. Baile, 358 Mo. 625, 633, 216 S.W.2d 92, 96 (1948).
14. See Schaefer v. Causey, 8 Mo. App. 142 (St. L. 1879), aff'd on other
grounds, 76 Mo. 365 (1882).
15. See Boyd v. Margolin, 421 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1967) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 51-52 & 55 infra).
[Vol. 45
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It may also be helpful to examine the term "theory" in the context
of submitting instructions based on inconsistent theories. The term "theory"
can apply to different legal concepts. Thus, the theories of primary negli-
gence and humanitarian negligence may be inconsistent,1 6 and the theories
of contract and quantum meruit may be inconsistent.17 At the same time,
"theory" also may apply to different theories dealing with the same legal
concept. For example, two inconsistent theories may be based on one legal
concept such as contributory negligence,18 or humanitarian negligence.19
The implementation of the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions
(MAI) has not significantly affected the case law in the area of submitting
inconsistent instructions.20 Under the heading of "Old Principles Still in
Force," the MAI states, "Many established rules of instructing juries are
still in force although not specifically included in this book. . . . [The
force of such rules] is subservient to the overriding provisions and phi-
losophy of MA. ' 2 1 Recent Missouri cases thus continue to apply the same
rules regarding inconsistent instructions and to cite pre-MAI cases for
this proposition. 22
Certain rules of evidence may control a plaintiff's use of contradictory
facts in determining what theory or theories will be used in his submis-
sions. Although these rules have no relationship to the rules which dis-
allow the submission of inconsistent instructions, a discussion of the
evidentiary rules is important because both the evidentiary rules and
the submissions rules may be applicable to the facts of a given case. In
Missouri, a plaintiff generally may not adopt a witness' testimony con-
trary to the plaintiff's own testimony on basic facts within the plaintiff's
knowledge.23 Consequently, a plaintiff cannot base his theory of recovery
on evidence offered by his own witnesses or the defendant's witnesses if
it contradicts his own personal testimony. A plaintiff is also bound by the
testimony of his own witness unless24 it is contradicted by other evidence
16. See State ex rel. Tunget v. Shain, 340 Mo. 434, 101 S.W.2d 1 (1936) (dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 47 & 48 infra).
17. See Boyd v. Margolin, 421 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1967) (discussed in text ac-
companying notes 51-52 & 55 infra).
18. See Pigg v. Bridges, 352 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. En Banc 1961) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 64-66 infra).
19. See Kick v. Franklin, 342 Mo. 715, 117 S.W.2d 284 (1938) (discussed in
text accompanying notes 58 & 59 infra).
20. The effective date of the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions was Jan-
uary 1, 1965. Mo. APPROVED INsm. XXXI (1965 ed.).
21. Mo. APPRovED INSTR. L (1965 ed.).
22. See, e.g., Cover v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 454 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo. 1970).
23. Migneco v. Eckenfels, 397 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Mo. 1965).
24. Zabol v. Lasky, 555 S.W.2d 299, 305 (Mo. En Banc 1977). But see Vaeth
v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. 1972) (plaintiff not bound by his own or his
witness' estimate of time, speed, or distance). It has recently been held that neith-
er the rule binding a party to his own testimony nor the rule binding a party to
the uncontradicted testimony of his own witness applies to defendants. Overton
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offered by the plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiff cannot rely on evidence offered
by the defendant if it contradicts evidence his witness has offered.2 5
II. PLEADING INCONSI-TENT CLAims AND DEFENSES
At common law a party could not plead inconsistent claims or de-
fenses. 26 Missouri code pleading allowed inconsistent claims in the al-
ternative 27 but did not allow inconsistent defenses. 28 In 1943 Missouri
adopted Supreme Court Rule 55.12, a modified version of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2),2 9 relating to inconsistent pleadings. Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 55.12 stated:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense
or in separate counts or defenses. . . A party may also state as
many separate claims or defenses as he has whether based on
legal or equitable grounds or on both.80
In 1973 the rule was renumbered to Rule 55.10 and the last sentence was
amended to read, "A party may also state as many separate claims or de-
25. The rule binding the plaintiff to the uncontradicted testimony of his
own witness has not gone uncriticized:
To require a party to forego reliance on any theory opposed to his
personal, sworn testimony is one thing. But where he does not swear
one way or the other on the matter, it is wholly illogical to permit him
to rely on inconsistent theories, both supported by other evidence which
he introduces, and yet deny him that privilege if one of the theories comes
only from his opponent's case. One might even inquire how his opponent
can complain because the jury was asked to believe his evidence?
Mo. BAR C.L.E., MissouRi CIVIL INsaucnoNs § 2.3, at 32 (1961). This same
author suggests that binding a party to his own witness' evidence that he does
not contradict may have had its origin in the archaic doctrine forbidding im-
peachment of one's own witness, a doctrine which he contends has no present
validity since it developed when trials were "inquisitorial rather than adversary
and required 'oath-helpers' and compurgators rather than witnesses." Id.
26. B. SHPxMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAw PLEADING § 318 (3d ed. 1923).
There was, however, an exception where one of the allegations was superfluous.
Id.
27. Bratton v. Sharp Enterprises, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 306, 312 (Mo. App., K.C.
1977). Alternative pleading has been defined as a pleading drafted in terms of
"either-or" propositions. 5 C. WiuceT & A. MILL , FEDErAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: CIVIL § 1282 (1969).
28. See, e.g., Finley v. Williams, 325 Mo. 688, 696, 29 S.W.2d 103, 105 (1930);
Payne v. White, 288 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Mo. App., Spr. 1956).
29. The federal rule is identical to the Missouri rule except for the last two
sentences which read:
A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has
regardless of consistency and whether based on legal, equitable, or mari-
time grounds. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set
forth in Rule 11 [dealing with the attorney's signing of the petition which
among other things demonstrates his belief that there is good ground to
support the pleading].
Fr. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
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fenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or
equitable grounds."8 '
Both before and after the amendment, Rule 55.12 (current version
at Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 55.10) has been interpreted to continue the allowance
of pleading inconsistent claims in the alternative.8 2 It is still uncertain,
however, whether a party can now plead inconsistent defenses. The rule, as
originally adopted in 1943 and especially as amended in 1973, on its face
allows the pleading of inconsistent defenses. Nevertheless, no cases have
been found so holding and one Missouri court of appeals decision in 1956-
thirteen years after Rule 55.12 (current version at Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 55.10)
was first adopted-stated in dictum the old rule that a defendant may plead
as many defenses as he has, so long as they are not inconsistent.83 At the
same time, no Missouri cases have held that the rule does not allow the
pleading of inconsistent defenses.8 4 Moreover, several cases suggest in
dictum that inconsistent defenses can be pleaded. 5 At least one commen-
tator has interpreted Rule 55.12 (current version at Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 55.10)
to allow the pleading of inconsistent defenses, 6 and the nearly identical
federal statute has been so interpreted.8 7 While the case law is inconclusive,
31. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.10 (emphasis added). This amendment has been
interpreted to allow, for the first time, the pleading of both res ipsa loquitur
and specific negligence. City of Kennett v. Akers, 564 S.W.2d 41, 49 (Mo. En
Banc 1978); Bratton v. Sharp Enterprises, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Bratton v. Sharp Enterprises, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 306, 312-13 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1977); Burckhardt v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 534 S.W.2d 57, 63
(Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
33. Payne v. White, 288 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Mo. App., Spr. 1956).
34. Perhaps this dearth of cases suggests that courts, as a general practice,
allow the pleading of inconsistent defenses.
35. In Tomlin v. Alford, 351 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1961), the court stated, "Su-
preme Court Rule 55.12 [current version at Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.10] permits the
pleading of alternative and hypothetical defenses and specifically permits the
pleading of as many defenses as he has . . . .Defendant .. .must plead and
submit each and every submissible defense available to him, lest they be forever
lost." id. at 710.
Another case, Five Twelve Locust v. Mednikov, 270 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1954),
involved a disputed title to property upon which the wall of the defendant's build-
ing was located. The defendant claimed title to this property by adverse possession.
In an unrelated proceeding against a different plaintiff, the defendant offered as a
defense that the wall between his building and an adjoining building was a
common wall. The Missouri Supreme Court held that these defenses were not
inconsistent, but in dictum stated that, even if inconsistent, a party has a right
to assert any number of defenses alternatively or hypothetically, citing RSMo
§ 509.110 (1949) (current version at Mo. SuP. CT. R. 55.10). 270 S.W.2d at 776.
The language of Rule 55.10 does not suggest that a different standard should be
applied to inconsistent defenses in separate proceedings than to inconsistent de-
fenses in the same proceeding. Consequently, if the provision as construed in Five
Twelve Locust would allow inconsistent defenses to be pleaded in different pro-
ceedings, it should allow inconsistent defenses to be pleaded in the same pro-
ceeding.
36. C. Wheaton, Civil Rules Practice, 15 Missouas PRAcric Smums § 55.10-2
(1976).
37. See Simmons v. Orion Ins. Co., 366 F.2d 572, 574-75 (8th Cir. 1966);
Little v. Texaco, Inc., 456 F.2d 219, 220 (10th Cir. 1972).
1980]
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it appears that the pleading of inconsistent defenses is allowed in Mis-
souri.38
III. INSTRUCTIONS BASED ON INCONSISTENT THxoms
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 55.12 (current version at Mo. Sup. Ct.
R. 55.10) has been held to be solely a rule of pleading and not to apply
to the submission of instructions based on inconsistent theories.3 9 Futher-
more, the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions have not affected the case
law regarding such instructions.4 0 Consequently, Missouri case law must
be consulted to determine the Missouri rule for inconsistent instructions.
The rule generally stated is that a single party cannot submit instructions
based on inconsistent theories.4 1 While the majority of cases define incon-
sistency as any situation where proof of one theory necessarily disproves
the other theory,42 this standard has not been applied uniformly, and
several cases do not use it at all.43 Moreover, the courts that apply the
rule are in disagreement over whether a mere theoretical inconsistency
will prevent submission on both theories.
One line of cases states the definition of inconsistency given above-
that proof of one theory necessarily disproves the other-and then holds
that when there is only a theoretical inconsistency, not an inconsistency
in fact, a party will not be prevented from submitting both theories. The
clearest example of allowing the submission of instructions that are only
inconsistent in theory and not in fact is shown in cases dealing with in-
structions based on both primary and humanitarian negligence. In Mahan
v. Baile,4 4 the plaintiff sued for injuries resulting from an automobile
collision and submitted instructions on both primary and humanitarian
negligence. The primary negligence instruction dealt with driving at an
excessive rate of speed; the humanitarian negligence instruction dealt
with the defendant's ability to slacken his speed and thereby prevent the
accident. The Missouri Supreme Court expressly rejected any concern
with a theoretical, abstract, or philosophical inconsistency.45 It held that
inconsistency depended on the facts and there could be consistent evidence
38. Despite this uncertainty, it has been held that a defendant can plead a
counterclaim even if it is inconsistent with one of his defenses. Seiser v. Maggard,
457 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Mo. 1970).
39. Wallace v. Bounds, 369 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Mo. 1963). The opposite result
has been obtained by the federal courts and the Illinois courts. See text accompany-
ing notes 73-77 infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
41. See, e.g., Wallace v. Bounds, 369 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Mo. 1963); State
ex rel. Tunget v. Shain, 340 Mo. 434, 440, 101 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1936); Hampton v.
Cantrell, 464 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Mo. App., Spr. 1971).
42. See, e.g., Wallace v. Bounds, 369 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Mo. 1963); Mahan v.
Baile, 358 Mo. 625, 633, 216 S.W.2d 92, 96 (1948).
43. See text accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
44. 358 Mo. 625, 216 S.W.2d 92 (1948).
45. Id. at 633, 216 S.W.2d at 96.
[Vol. 45
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of both excessive speed and failure to slacken speed.4 6 Thus, the court
held that both instructions could be submitted.
Instructions based on both primary and humanitarian negligence at
times will be factually inconsistent and the court will force a party to
elect only one of the instructions before going to the jury. Such a situation
was present in another automobile accident case, State ex rel. Tunget v.
Shain.4 The primary negligence instruction in Shain was based on the
defendant's failure to keep his automobile under reasonable control; the
humanitarian negligence instruction predicated recovery on the defendant
having sufficient control of his automobile to stop it and avoid the colli-
sion. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the defendant could not both
be out of control of his car and still have the ability to stop the car.48
Because both theories were factually inconsistent, the supreme court re-
versed the trial court for allowing the plaintiff to submit both instructions
to the jury.
Another case where a court considered a factual rather than a theo-
retical inconsistency was Wallace v. Bounds,49 the case upon which the
first example in the introduction is based. The decedent's administrator
wanted to sue for personal injury and for wrongful death. The statute
allowing him to sue for personal injury was applicable only if the accident
did not result in the decedent's death; the wrongful death statute was ef-
fective only if the accident caused the decedent's death. The Missouri Su-
preme Court held these to be inconsistent theories because "proof of one
negates, repudiates and disproves the other."50 Mahan, Shain, and Wallace,
taken together, imply that if the theories are inconsistent, but can be
proven by the same set of facts or by two sets of facts which are not con-
tradictory, then a party will be allowed to submit both theories in his
instructions. Conversely, if the facts supporting the two theories are in-
consistent, a party cannot submit instructions based on both theories.
Another line of cases does not require a factual inconsistency before
disallowing submissions based on inconsistent theories. In these cases, the
courts look only to the theories, and not to the facts supporting each
theory, for inconsistency. In one such area, dealing with contract and
quantum meruit, the courts disagree over whether there is a theoretical
inconsistency. In Boyd v. Margolin,5 1 the plaintiff alleged that he had
arranged a buyer for the defendant's truck line according to an agree-
ment entered into with the defendant. The plaintiff's first count sought a
46. Id. at 633-34, 216 S.W.2d at 96.
47. 40 Mo. 434, 101 S.W.2d 1 (1936).
48. Id. at 438, 101 S.W.2d at 3.
49. 369 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1963).
50. Id. at 142. In Downs v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 24 Ill. App. 2d 24, 163N.E.2d 858 (1959), the court held that it was improper to require an administrator
to elect between a count under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act and a count forpain and suffering under the Illinois Survival Act even though such claims were
inconsistent.
51. 421 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1967).
1980]
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five percent commission based on this contract; his second count was for
a five percent commission based on quantum meruit. Without considering
the facts, the Missouri Supreme Court stated: "[I]t seems that these
theories of recovery are inconsistent and a party may be required to elect
as to which he will submit to the jury." 52
To the extent that the theories are themselves inconsistent, it would
seem that a party could never submit instructions based on both contract
and quantum meruit. Other cases suggest, however, that contract and
quantum meruit are not theoretically inconsistent. In Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Lingle Refrigeration Co,15 the plaintiff sought, in
contract and quantum meruit, payment for making dies. The Kansas City
Court of Appeals did not consider the facts in determining whether these
theories were inconsistent. Rather, it relied exclusively on earlier case law.
In Kaiser, however, the court determined that the two theories were not
inconsistent and held that the trial court properly allowed both submissions
to go to the jury.5 4 The holding by the Kansas City Court of Appeals in
Kaiser would seem to have been implicitly overruled by the supreme
court ruling in Boyd that contract and quantum meruit are inconsistent.
,Kaiser, however, has more precedential support than Boyd, and could be
argued as the proper law of Missouri.55
Another case that considered only a theoretical inconsistency to de-
52. Id. at 768.
53. 350 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961).
54. Id. at 131-32.
55. Boyd relied primarily on cases that limited recovery to the pleaded theory(contract) to the exclusion of any other theory (in this case quantum meruit).
Such cases would seem not controlling however, when both contract and quantum
meruit have been pleaded. On the other hand, Kaiser cited several earlier Mis-
souri cases holding that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to elect on which count-
contract or quantum meruit-he will go to the jury. It is interesting to note that
Boyd relied on Krupnick & Assoc., Inc. v. Hellmich, 378 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1964).
The Boyd court recognized that Krupnick did not deal with the issue of election
between inconsistent theories. Nevertheless, the court in Boyd used dictum in
Krupniclh to illustrate the inconsistencies between the theories being considered.
A close reading of Krupnick indicates that the court was only concerned with a
factual inconsistency and not a theoretical one. In Krupnick, the plaintiff, an
ad agency, contracted to provide advertising services to Branchell Company. The
plaintiff's commission was to be a percentage of the cost of media space actually
used. The plaintiff did preparatory work for Branchell. Branchell was then ac-
quired by defendant Lenox Plastics, Inc. Lenox ordered the advertising campaign
stopped before most of the ads were run and before plaintiff had collected most
of its commissions. The plaintiff sued on the contract and lost both at the trial
level and on appeal. The plaintiff then moved for a remand to allow amendment
of its petition to seek recovery under quantum meruit. The court overruled the
motion and held that the express contract proved by the plaintiff precluded re-
covery on quantum meruit. The court, however, went on to state that "[tlhis
express agreement with regard to the source of plaintiff's compensation [i.e., that
it be a percentage of the cost of media space] negatives the existence of any
agreement implied either in fact or by law to compensate them on a different
basis." Id. at 570. Thus, the Krupnick court looked to a factual inconsistency and
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termine whether both theories could be submitted to the jury dealt with
different theories of humanitarian negligence. In Rosanbalm v. Thomp-
son,56 involving a traincar collision, the plaintiff submitted humanitarian
negligence instructions based on a failure to slacken speed and a failure
to sound a horn. There appears to be no factual inconsistency between
slackening speed and sounding a horn because the defendant could have
done both. Nevertheless, the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that
these theories were inconsistent because evidence that the defendant could
have slackened his speed "would have been inconsistent with the theory
that a failure to warn was the proximate cause of the collision." 57
The validity of the Rosanbalm holding is questionable. The Rosan-
balm court concluded that its holding was controlled by a Missouri Su-
preme Court decision, Kick v. Franklin.58 In Kick, two instructions based
on humanitarian negligence-failure to sound a horn and failure to slow
down-were held to be inconsistent. The inconsistency that the Kick court
found was that the plaintiff's testimony concerning the location of the
train when it could have sounded its horn and effectively have warned the
plaintiff was inconsistent with the location of the train when it could have
slowed enough to have missed the plaintiff's car.59 Because Kick dealt with
a factual inconsistency not found in Rosanbalm, Kick should not have
been controlling.
Several cases disagree over whether a theoretical inconsistency based
on the torts of negligence and willfulness should prevent a party from
submitting both instructions. In Ervin v. Coleman,6 0 the plaintiff sued
for damages suffered in an automobile accident. His verdict director was
based on negligence, but he also asked for punitive damages based on the
defendant's alleged willful conduct. The Springfield Court of Appeals
held these to be inconsistent theories of recovery even though they were
based on the same acts and conduct. It concluded that the trial court erred
in allowing the plaintiff to recover both actual and punitive damages.61
Thus, the Ervin court looked to a theoretical rather than a factual dis-
tinction.
An older case, Waechter v. St. Louis & Meramac River Railroad,62
56. 148 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. App., K.C. 1941).
57. Id. at 834.
58. 342 Mo. 715, 117 S.W.2d 284 (1938).
59. Id. at 723-25, 117 S.W.2d at 288-89.
60. 454 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. App., Spr. 1970). To the extent that Ervin held
as a matter of law that a party cannot recover actual damages predicated on ordi-
nary negligence, or punitive damages predicated on the defendant's complete
indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others, it has been over-
ruled. Sharp v. Robberson, 495 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. En Banc 1973). The Sharp court
distinguished and limited its holding to punitive damages premised on indiffer-
ence or disregard for the safety of others. It did not deal with punitive damages
premised on willful conduct, the subject for which this Comment cites Ervin.
61. Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. App., Spr. 1970).
62. 113 Mo. App. 270, 88 S.W. 147 (St. L. 1905).
1980]
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approached the problem differently. In Waechter, the plaintiff sued in
separate counts on theories of negligence and willfulness for personal
injuries resulting from being hit by a trolley car. While recognizing that
the two counts based on the same acts were theoretically inconsistent, the
St. Louis Court of Appeals allowed submission on both counts, stating that
the inconsistency was not in the act but in its quality and thus the evidence
would justify a verdict on either count.63
As stated previously, one line of cases is not concerned with incon-
sistencies at all. In Pigg v. Bridges,64 the second example in the introduc-
tion, the defendant argued that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
either because it was so dark that he could not see beyond the doorway
and should not have entered, or because it was light enough for him to see
the stairway. The defendant submitted his instructions in the conjunctive
which the Missouri Supreme Court held to be prejudicial error since it
required the jury to find two facts which could not coexist.65 In dictum,
however, the court stated that the defendant would have been entitled to
submit both theories of negligence disjunctively.66 Thus, even though
being light enough to see and being too dark to see were factually in-
consistent, the supreme court in effect suggested that such an inconsistency
would not prevent submission on both theories. .
It is difficult to sum up the Missouri position. Whether courts look
to factual or theoretical inconsistencies, strong arguments can be made
for allowing both submissions when an inconsistency is found.r This is
true despite several justifications for not allowing such submissions. One
justification for not allowing inconsistent submissions is the likelihood that
the jury will be confused by the inconsistency.68 Such confusion could be
63. Id. at 277-78, 88 S.W. at 149. There is an apparent conflict between these
cases, but they can be distinguished. In Ervin, the plaintiff was allowed to recover
under both theories at the trial level and not simply to submit both and see which
theory was supported by the facts found by the jury. Waechter allowed the plain-
tiff to submit both theories but recover under only one. Thus, while the Ervin
court's language dealt with the submission of inconsistent theories, its opinion
could be interpreted as holding only that a party cannot submit and recover on
inconsistent theories. This would not conflict with the Waechter holding that a
party can submit verdict directors based on willfulness and negligence and let the
jury determine where the truth lies.
64. 352 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
65. Id. at 31.
66. Id. This statement was cited in Sanders v. Carl Berry Oil Co., 359 S.W.2d
769, 772 (Mo. 1962), but only as dictum. It is interesting to note that, if the de-
fendant had been allowed to submit both alleged acts of contributory negligence
in Pigg as the court suggested he could have, he would have been able to rely
on testimony offered by his opponent which contradicted his own. This would
have been contrary to the evidentiary rule binding a party to his own testimony.
See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
67. Of course, a party must have evidentiary support for each theory before
he can submit an instruction based on it. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bush, 418 S.W.2d
601, 606 (Mo. App., Spr. 1967); Madison v. Dodson, 412 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1967).
68. Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. App., Spr. 1970).
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ameliorated, however, by requiring that inconsistent theories which are
submitted be designated as such and be dearly stated.69
A second justification for not allowing inconsistent theories to be
submitted is an opposition to allowing logical inconsistency. As stated in
State ex rel. Tunget v. Shain,70 such inconsistency "presents analogy to
that fabled acrobatic feat of riding, at the same time, two horses going in
opposite directions."7 1 In many situations dealing with inconsistent sub-
missions, a party does not want to ride two horses but rather wants to know
which of two horses to ride. In the typical case, a party does not know what
the jury will ultimately find as the true facts, and feels that he has a right
to recover on either set of facts, but not on both. Forcing a party to choose
between inconsistent theories before submission to the jury forces the sub-
mitting party to second-guess the finder of fact. If he guesses wrong, he
loses even though he may have had a valid claim or defense based upon
the theory he was forced to discard.
The majority of cases give no justification for disallowing the sub-
mission of inconsistent theories; instead, they rely solely on the weight of
precedent. Reliance on such precedent is questionable since forcing an
election between inconsistent theories may have been derived from earlier
outdated ideas of pleading when the purpose of pleading was to produce
a single issue.72
The federal courts have been unwilling to limit a party to an in-
struction based on one legal theory when there are other inconsistent
theories available73 In Western Machinery Co. v. Consolidated Uranium
Mines, Inc.,7 4 the plaintiff filed suit to recover $23,000 for labor and ma-
terials furnished. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit allowed the plaintiff to submit instructions based both on contract
and quantum meruit, and stated:
Point is made of inconsistencies of the two legal theories with
the suggestion that a choice should have been required. But we
are not concerned with the nicety of pleaded legal theories. It is
enough that both counts, considered separately or together, state
a claim on which relief can be granted, and we are therefore in-
terested to know whether the proof supports either or both theor-
ies, whether inconsistent or not.7 5
The Illinois courts have also adopted a liberal attitude toward sub-
mitting inconsistent theories based on contrary facts. For example, in
69. This is the practice of Illinois courts. See McCormick v. Kopmann, 23
Ill. App. 2d 189, 197, 161 N.E.2d 720, 726 (1959).
70. 340 Mo. 434, 101 S.W.2d 1 (1936).
71. Id. at 438, 101 S.W.2d at 2.
72. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIL PROCEDURE 89 (2d ed. 1977).
73. See Whitt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, & Co., 461 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir.
1972); Western Mach. Co. v. Consolidated Uranium Mines, Inc., 247 F.2d 685(10th Cir. 1957); C. WRIGHT, LAW oF FEDEAL CouRTs 322 (3d ed. 1973).
74. 247 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1957).
75. Id. at 686.
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McCormick v. Kopmann,7 6 the plaintiff's husband was killed in an auto-
mobile accident and there was evidence that he was intoxicated at the
time. In one count, the plaintiff sued one defendant for negligently driving
a truck into the decedent's automobile. In a separate count, the plaintiff
sued another defendant for negligently providing the decedent with al-
cohol. These two counts were inconsistent because the latter assumed the
plaintiff's decedent was drunk and the former assumed he was not. The
court allowed the submission on both counts and stated:
Plaintiff pleaded alternative counts because she was uncertain
as to what the true facts were .... [S]he was entitled to have all
the evidence submitted to the trier of fact, and to have the jury
decide where the truth lay... The provisions of the Civil Practice
Act authorizing alternative pleading [and patterned after Rule
8(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], necessarily con-
template that the pleader adduce proof in support of both sets of
allegations or legal theories, leaving to the jury the determination
of the facts.7 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Inconsistent pleadings are presently allowed in Missouri, if worded
in the alternative. It would also seem that Rule 55.10 permits the pleading
of inconsistent defenses, and good arguments can be made that it should.
The case law, however, is unclear.
Missouri's position regarding the submission of instructions based on
inconsistent theories is likewise unclear. The general rule is that such sub-
missions are not allowed, but Missouri case law is in conflict regarding
this rule. Several cases disallow instructions only if factual inconsistencies
are present, while other cases find instructions inconsistent on the basis
of theoretical inconsistencies without considering the facts.
Regardless of the proper test, Missouri's concern with inconsistent
instructions seems misplaced. No strong justifications have been made for
not allowing both instructions to be submitted when they are found to
be inconsistent. Furthermore, such a practice is often unfair to a party
who does not know what facts will be found by the jury. Through the
operation of such rules a party is faced with the possibility of choosing
a theory that may subsequently be determined not to be supported by the
facts. Justice and fairness would more often be served by allowing parties
to go to the jury on both theories and letting the jury determine where
the truth lies.
EDWARD M. PULTZ
76. 23 Ill. App. 2d 189, 161 N.E.2d 720 (1959).
77. Id. at 205, 161 N.E.2d at 730. This language is cited in Downs v. Ex-
change Nat'l Bank, 24 Ill. App. 2d 24, 29, 163 N.E.2d 858, 861 (1959), which dealt
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